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Lance Compa 
ANOTHER LOOK AT NAFTA 
"W 
^ H ^ V eak," "toothless," "worthless" 
and "a farce"—these were some of the epithets 
applied to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) labor side accord negoti-
ated by the United States, Mexico, and Canada 
in 1993. Trade unionists and labor rights sup-
porters were upset, first by the text of the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC) when it appeared, then by early ex-
periences after it went into effect on January 1, 
1994. But those wanting progress on labor rights 
and standards in international trade should be 
careful of making some idealized "best" the 
enemy of the good. 
The Text 
When the side accord was completed in mid-
1993, critics cited three main problems with the 
text. First, it did not create common norms for 
the three countries. Instead, the negotiators pre-
served national sovereignty in the formulation 
of labor laws and the setting of standards, mak-
ing "effective enforcement" of domestic law the 
focus of the accord. What good is an agreement, 
said critics, that leaves weak laws and standards 
in place instead of pulling them up to higher, 
harmonized levels? 
The second major criticism involved the 
bureaucracy, procedural maze, and seeming 
cross-purposes built into the agreement. 
NAALC creates separate domestic agencies in 
each country's Labor Department, called the 
National Administrative Offices (NAO), which 
are responsible for a first review of labor law 
matters in another country. This means that 
complainants must turn to another government, 
often in another language, to raise their con-
cerns. 
The agreement sets up a council of minis-
ters and a permanent, trinational secretariat that 
together make up a "Commission for Labor Co-
operation." The secretariat conducts research and 
reporting on comparative labor law and labor 
market issues and staffs ad hoc advisory groups, 
evaluation committees, and arbitration panels 
composed of nongovernmental experts from each 
of the countries. 
Each of these bodies has complicated juris-
dictional reach, and among them they combine 
various research, reporting, reviewing, consult-
ing, advising, and decision making powers. 
Timetables for different levels of review, con-
sultations, evaluations, and arbitrations make for 
a minimum of several months, and as much as 
two to three years, before procedures could be 
exhausted. 
The side agreement also called for a broad 
program of cooperative activities on labor law 
and labor market matters among governments. 
Critics said this feature might make governments 
reluctant to question or criticize each other's law 
enforcement under the agreement's review, 
evaluation, and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The third objection addressed the division 
of NAALC's eleven "Labor Principles"—basic 
labor rights to which the governments commit 
themselves in making the deal—into three cat-
egories or tiers of treatment. The first tier in-
volves so-called "industrial relations" subjects 
covered by the first three labor principles: (1) 
freedom of association and the right to orga-
nize, (2) the right to bargain collectively, and 
(3) the right to strike. Though they lie at the 
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heart of international labor rights, these issues 
get the lowest level of treatment under the 
NAALC—the first-level "review" process, with 
optional ministerial consultations. 
Eight labor principles covering prohibition 
of forced labor, nondiscrimination, equal pay for 
men and women, workers' compensation, mi-
grant labor protection, child labor, minimum 
wage, and occupational safety and health issues 
can proceed from review to evaluation. Only the 
last three of these are susceptible to the full range 
of treatment that includes review, evaluation, 
and arbitration, with possible application of 
sanctions incasesofa "persistent pattern of fail-
ure to effectively enforce" laws in those areas. 
Critics argued that narrowing the funnel as is-
sues move forward only chokes off possibilities 
for enhancing labor rights in North America. 
^Pince it took effect at the beginning of 1994, 
six cases have been treated under the NAALC. 
Four involved alleged interference with inde-
pendent union organizing at Mexican maquila-
dora factories, one concerned union members' 
rights in a Mexican government ministry, and 
one dealt with a shutdown by Sprint of a Cali-
fornia facility in the midst of a union organiz-
ing campaign. These cases left labor rights ad-
vocates frustrated and disappointed because they 
did not lead to what complaining parties sought: 
reinstatement of fired workers or new union for-
mation at each of the workplaces. Moreover, be-
cause each of these cases involved the right to 
organize, one of the three "first-tier" labor prin-
ciples, they could not proceed to evaluation or 
arbitration. 
These criticisms should not be discounted. 
A "level playing field," at least for irreducible 
"core" standards on such issues as freedom of 
association, nondiscrimination, and forced la-
bor, for example, and strong, rapid enforcement 
against violators is the goal of everyone who 
advocates labor rights in international trade. 
However, criticism should be measured not 
against an ideal but against the reality of inter-
national trade and labor negotiations in the cur-
rent regional and global economy. Even then, 
judging the effectiveness of the NAALC 
should await a broad experience of the 
agreement's potential uses. In this light, the 
scorn directed at the NAALC reflects more im-
patience than analysis. 
Common Standards, 
Bureaucracy, and Tiers 
It's easy to hold in principle that a labor rights 
clause in a trade agreement ought to provide for 
universal standards. But it's not so easy in prac-
tice, particularly when there is wide economic 
disparity among the negotiating countries, and 
when a single country accounts for 85 percent 
of the economic activity in the trade area. 
In the NAFTA context there is also a sensi-
tive problem of sovereignty concerns in all three 
countries. These are not just concerns of gov-
ernment officials; they are deeply held in all 
sectors of society, including trade unions and 
social activist communities. Many Mexican and 
Canadian labor policy analysts look at the state 
of U.S. labor law and the U.S. labor movement, 
and recoil at the prospect of homogenized la-
bor laws. They are not about to give up laws 
created by their own representatives, adminis-
tered by agencies accountable to their own ex-
ecutive branches, and reviewed by their own 
judiciary, to a new supranational agency that 
might be dominated by the economic interests 
of the United States. 
U.S. trade unionists ought to be equally skep-
tical about solving their own labor law problems 
through some kind of international legerdemain. 
Could the NAFTA side agreement overturn the 
frequently proclaimed deficiencies in U.S. law— 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elec-
tion rules, the striker replacement doctrine, con-
tingent workers' lack of protection, and others— 
without action by Congress? These are issues 
for American workers to address through their 
own organizing and political action, not by de-
manding some "silver bullet" in the NAALC. 
Another problem with creating trinational 
labor norms lies in the fundamental labor law 
jurisdiction of each country. Mexican labor law 
is primarily based in the federal Constitution 
and federal statutes, with a large state role in 
enforcement. Most of the maquiladora factories 
come under state government jurisdiction in the 
five border states of Mexico, for example. U.S. 
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labor law is also federal, but with a constricted 
role for the states. State moves to ban striker 
replacements, for example, have been struck 
down by the courts as pre-empted by federal 
law. In contrast, Canadian labor law is almost 
totally provincial, not federal. Each province 
enjoys its own sovereignty in fashioning and en-
forcing labor laws, and is not disposed to let 
the federal government hand over these matters 
to a trinational agency. 
• hese differences did not just happen. They 
result from national histories replete with anti-
colonial wars, civil wars, constitutional crises, 
regional conflicts, and class struggles. With 
three ministries of labor sitting down to negoti-
ate the first labor agreement connected to a trade 
pact, it is unrealistic to expect them to undo 
these differences and defer to a supranational 
power. 
The approach taken in the NAFTA side deal, 
emphasizing "effective enforcement" of domes-
tic labor law, is a more practical starting point 
than attempting to fashion common norms. Any 
system of law is really only as good as its sys-
tem of enforcement. U.S. experience with a re-
surgent sweatshop industry in major American 
cities should give pause to demands that Mexico 
or any developing country "raise" its standards 
to the levels of industrialized countries before 
enforcement is strengthened in every country. 
Instead of yielding sovereignty over their 
labor laws and standards, the NAFTA countries 
shaped the NAALC to open themselves up to 
trinational scrutiny of their enforcement re-
gimes. Such scrutiny is conducted under the 
NAALC's review process, through special stud-
ies by the secretariat, and through evaluation 
and dispute resolution by independent, nongov-
ernmental experts who are free to reach their 
own conclusions about the effectiveness of each 
country's labor law enforcement. This represents 
an extraordinary candor in international rela-
tions, in contrast to traditional sovereignty rules. 
It should not be scorned because it fails to 
achieve a supposed ideal of international fair 
labor standards and swift, sure punishment pow-
ers. 
As for bureaucracy, it is true that the NAFTA 
labor side accord sets up a complex structure 
and procedures. But this is typical of interna-
tional agreements. Anyone who ever brought a 
labor rights case to the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO), to the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
or to the Organization of American States (OAS) 
or the United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sions can attest to their complex links, slow 
turns, and elliptical conclusions. For that mat-
ter, American trade unions and employers who 
have been through the mill of NLRB proceed-
ings and their judicial appeals should hardly be 
disappointed in the world's first international 
trade and labor agreement's red tape. 
Similarly, a "tiered" approach to labor is-
sues is not unusual in the international context. 
The European Union (EU) also divides the 
twelve elements of its Social Charter into three 
tiers of treatment, much like those of the NAFTA 
labor pact. To be precise, the same subjects sus-
ceptible only to first level review in the North 
American scheme—rights of association and or-
ganizing, collective bargaining (as distinct from 
consultation with "works councils," which are 
something else in the EU scheme), and the right 
to strike—are specifically excluded by the 
Maastricht Treaty from any form of Europe-
wide legislation. For now, these issues are so 
central to national identity, history, and work-
place culture that no society accepts changes 
forced from outside its own body politic. 
The Cases 
The first cases under NAALC provided an im-
portant forum for public discussion of labor con-
ditions in NAFTA countries. Such matters had 
usually been taken up by anonymous officials 
in obscure proceedings. Now they are subjected 
to a formal, public review with cleansing sun-
shine effects. 
While the first maquiladora cases ended 
with no follow-up ministerial consultations, 
publicity surrounding them prompted reinstate-
ment of several workers, and widespread instruc-
tions from U.S. firms' headquarters to their 
Mexican subsidiaries to comply carefully with 
Mexican labor laws. 
Ministerial consultations in the other cases 
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led to a wide range of trinational contacts and 
events that illuminate labor law realities in the 
three NAALC countries. One discussion, for 
example, compared Mexico's union registration 
system, the U.S. NLRB election system, and sev-
eral Canadian provinces' "card-check" systems 
for union certification. In the Sprint case, the 
three labor ministers held a widely publicized 
public forum and instructed the trinational labor 
secretariat to conduct the first-ever comparative 
study of the effects of plant closings on work-
ers' freedom of association and right to orga-
nize in the three countries. Such mutual efforts 
are indispensable for creating a knowledge base 
for progress in trinational treatment of labor 
rights issues. 
Continued reviews can encourage govern-
ments to strengthen their enforcement efforts and 
encourage businesses to turn toward voluntary 
codes of conduct or some other form of self-regu-
lation on workers' rights and labor standards. 
Where trade union actions are implicated in a 
review, efforts to strengthen democratic partici-
pation in union affairs may result. 
IwAFTA's labor side agreement contains sev-
eral positive features for labor rights advocacy 
that ought to be appreciated, or at least tested 
over a long term, before drawing any conclu-
sions about its worth. Used creatively, the agree-
ment provides an opportunity for advancing 
workers' rights in the globalizing economy. It 
can be used in all three countries by trade union-
ists and labor rights advocates, by government 
officials responsible for labor standards, and by 
enterprises looking to a "high road" employment 
relations strategy. The challenge for labor rights 
supporters is to find such creative uses, not to 
lament lost opportunities for the perfect agree-
ment. 
The agreement's positive features include the 
establishment of the labor rights-trade linkage 
as a matter of policy in trade agreements; the 
wide range of the agreement's "Labor Prin-
ciples," compared to the narrower definition of 
international labor rights in most other trade and 
labor contexts; and the variety of cross-border 
avenues and arenas that it opens up for interna-
tional cooperation in support of workers' rights. 
The Principle of the Thing 
A strong reaction is underway against the very 
idea of a labor rights-trade link, also known as 
the "social clause" in trade discourse. The prime 
minister of Malaysia, for example, has repeat-
edly attacked labor rights proposals as an attempt 
to impose "Western values" and "Western con-
cepts of trade unions" on developingAsian coun-
tries. 
The ILO, the OECD, the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and other in-
ternational bodies have all shied away from link-
ing trade and labor rights. In this light, the 
NAALC is a unique accomplishment of the gov-
ernments of Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States. It backs up the linkage of labor rights and 
trade policy with mechanisms for cross-border 
reviews and potential sanctions when workers' 
rights are violated and governments fail to en-
force their laws. Critics should appreciate just 
how big a breakthrough it was for the North 
American trade negotiators to reach this point, 
compared to progress on the "social clause" in 
other contexts. 
T h e Scope of the 
N A A L C ' s " L a b o r Principles" 
Another important breakthrough in the NAFTA 
side agreement lies in its movement beyond the 
usual formulation of "core" labor standards. 
Even while they reject a labor rights-trade link, 
the ILO, the European Union, the World Bank, 
and the OECD limit their debate to a labor rights 
"core" embracing freedom of association and 
the right to organize while barring forced labor 
and discrimination (sometimes adding child la-
bor). 
In contrast to these three or four issues, 
NAALC specifies eleven Labor Principles that 
run the length and breadth of workers' concerns. 
They include all those mentioned in other at-
tempts to define a "core," and add a forthright 
endorsement of the right to strike—something 
most international instruments avoid (there is 
no ILO Convention on the right to strike, for 
example). NAALC goes on to embrace matters 
usually untreated in labor rights discourse but 
vitally important to workers—minimum wages, 
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hours of work, overtime pay, workers' compen-
sation, protection of migrants, occupational 
safety and health. The fact that these issues are 
opened up to cross-border treatment gives the 
agreement a concrete content often lacking in 
vague "core" labor rights definitions. 
Untested Forums 
The cases raised thus far under the NAALC all 
involved the first of the agreement's eleven prin-
ciples: freedom of association and the right to 
organize. No cases involving any of the other 
ten principles has been initiated. The agree-
ment's independent evaluation procedure has not 
been invoked, nor has the arbitration mechanism 
been put to the test. 
In sum, one subject matter—organizing— 
has been treated at the stage-one review level, 
when the potential exists for three subjects— 
organizing, bargaining, and striking—to get 
such first-level treatment. Five other subjects— 
forced labor, equal pay, nondiscrimination, 
workers compensation, and migrant labor—can 
get two levels of treatment: review and evalua-
tion. Three more—child labor, minimum wages, 
and safety and health—can get all three levels 
of treatment: review, evaluation and arbitration. 
Experience with just one of a possible twenty-
two combinations of subject and treatment is 
hardly the basis for conclusions about the 
agreement's worth. 
The potential use of an Evaluation Commit-
tee of Experts (ECE) is especially interesting. 
Eight topics are susceptible to an evaluation un-
der the NAALC. The ECE procedure is delib-
erately nonaccusatory. It can be initiated by one 
government alone, as long as it is willing to open 
up its own enforcement record in the subject 
matter being evaluated. But now it is not gov-
ernment officials undertaking the evaluation. It 
is an independent panel of experts from the three 
countries who can undertake their own compara-
tive analysis, reports, and recommendations. 
This could be a powerful tool for promoting ef-
fective labor law enforcement. Interested unions, 
employers, or other groups could call to their 
government's attention problems that might lend 
themselves to a ministerial request for an ECE. 
Collaborating across borders, such groups could 
encourage all the governments to undertake an 
ECE in a recognized area of common concern. 
Beyond that, they could ask for cases implicat-
ing child labor, minimum wage, or occupational 
safety and health issues to advance beyond 
evaluation to the dispute resolution level of treat-
ment, if two governments agree to carry such 
cases forward. 
Another key outgrowth of the NAFTA la-
bor side accord is the process of exchange, com-
munication, and collaboration among labor 
rights advocates at the trinational level (see box). 
Under the agreement's unusual cross-cutting 
procedures, issues involving practices in one 
country must be initiated in or by another coun-
try. Thus, trade unionists and their allies are 
compelled to collaborate across North Ameri-
can borders to use NAALC mechanisms. 
Labor rights advocates need to view the side 
agreement not as a chariot of fire righting all 
wrongs against labor, but as one that creates new 
space for governments, employers, and unions 
to honor workers' rights. This "opening up" of 
labor rights debates in both domestic and inter-
national forums is one of the most important 
results of NAALC. 
• • n y number of idealized "social charters" 
with universal standards and swift, powerful en-
forcement powers could be drafted by critics of 
the labor side agreement. But the agreement had 
to be negotiated by sovereign governments, each 
with its own swirling, often clashing, business, 
labor, and political currents. 
The result is a hybrid agreement. It preserves 
sovereignty, but creates mutual obligations. It 
sets up new domestic agencies as well as a 
trinational secretariat. It combines broad coop-
eration and consultation programs alongside 
review, evaluation, and dispute resolut ion 
mechanisms. But above all, the agreement pro-
motes engagement on labor rights and labor 
standards on an unprecedented international 
scale. It's worth becoming a player, not just a 
critic. • 
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